Clean Water Act Reach Limited: U.S. Supreme Court Overview
June 19 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Supreme Court limited the reach of the Clean Water Act, saying it applies only to wetlands with a close connection to a river, lake or some other major waterway.
The justices, voting 5-4, ordered a new round of hearings for two sets of Michigan landowners whose efforts to build on their property have been stymied by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The majority was divided in its reasoning, with Justice Anthony Kennedy refusing to join four other justices in putting even more restraints on the federal regulators.
Kennedy's separate opinion now becomes the controlling law. He established a new test, saying the Corps can regulate only wetlands that have a ``significant nexus'' to a major waterway. He also said that in both cases before the justices, the Corps had at least some evidence of that type of connection.
Kennedy's reasoning drew criticism from both ends of the court. Justice Antonin Scalia called Kennedy's test ``opaque'' and said it ``tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its same expansive reading again.''
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas joined Scalia's opinion. The case marked the first environmental test for the court's newest justices, Roberts and Alito.
Stevens Dissent
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, said Kennedy's test will create new uncertainty and additional work for regulators and landowners. He also said the new test ``will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered by the act in the long run.''
Commerce Clause
In focusing on the meaning of the Clean Water Act, the court didn't decide a more far-reaching question presented by the case -- whether Congress has power to regulate those wetlands under the Constitution's Commerce Clause.
http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/jun/scotus/060619rapanos.pdf
"We first addressed the proper interpretation of 33 U. S. C. §1362(7)s phrase the waters of the United States in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U. S. 121 (1985). That case concerned a wetland that was adjacent to a body of navigable water, because the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondents property to . . . a navigable waterway. Id., at 131;see also 33 CFR §328.3(b) (2004). Noting that the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one, and that the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins, 474 U. S., at 132, we upheld the Corps interpretation of the waters of the United States to include wetlands that actually abut[ted] on traditional navigable waters. Id., at 135."
"In these consolidated cases, we consider whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute waters of the United States within the meaning of the Act."
"Wetlands are waters of the United States if they bear the significant nexus of physical connection, which makes them as a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States. What other nexus could conceivably cause them to be waters of the United States? JUSTICE KENNEDYs test is that they, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as navigable, post, at 23 (emphasis added). But what possible linguistic usage would accept that whatever (alone or in combination) affects waters of the United States is waters of the United States?"
"JUSTICE KENNEDY reach the conclusion he has arrived at. Instead of limiting its meaning by reference to the text it was applying, he purports to do so by reference to what he calls the purpose of the statute. Its purpose is to clean
up the waters of the United States, and therefore anything that might significantly affect the purity of those waters bears a significant nexus to those waters, and thus (he never says this, but the text of the statute demands thathe mean it) is those waters. This is the familiar tactic of substituting the purpose of the statute for its text, freeing the Court to write a different statute that achieves the same purpose. To begin with, as we have discussed earlier, clean water is not the only purpose of the statute. So is the preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions. 33 U. S. C. §1251(b). JUSTICE KENNEDYs test takes no account of this purpose. More fundamentally, however, the test simply rewrites the statute, using for that purpose the gimmick of significant nexus. It would have been an easy matter for Congress to give the Corps jurisdiction over all wetlands (or, for that matter, all dry lands) that significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the United States. It did not do that, but instead explicitly limited jurisdiction to waters of the United States."
"Because the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard to determine if these wetlands are covered waters of the United States, and because of the paucity of the record in both of these cases, the lower courts should determine, in the first instance, whether the ditches or drains near each wetland are waters in the ordinary sense of containing a relatively permanent flow; and (if they are) whether the wetlands in question are adjacent to these waters in the sense of possessing a continuous surface connection that creates the boundary-drawing problem we addressed in Riverside Bayview."
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
"Five years ago, this Court rejected the position of the Army Corps of Engineers on the scope of its authority to regulate wetlands under the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC). The Corps had taken the view that its authority was essentially limitless; this Court explained that such a boundless view was inconsistent with the limiting terms Congress had used in the Act. Id., at 167174."
"Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water Act, the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority."
"It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case
basis."
JUSTICE STEVENS DISSENTS:
"In my view, the proper analysis is straightforward. The Army Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters preserve the quality of our Nations waters by, among other things,
providing habitat for aquatic animals, keeping excessive sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and reducing downstream flooding by absorbing water at times of high flow."
"The facts related to the 230-acre Salzburg site are illustrative. In 1988, John Rapanos asked the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) to inspect the site in order to discuss with him the feasibility of building a shopping center there. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04 1034, p. B15. An MDNR inspector informed Rapanos that the land probably included wetlands that were waters of the United States and sent him an application for a permit under §404 of the Act.1 Rapanos then hired a wetland consultant, Dr. Frederick Goff. After Dr. Goff concluded
that the land did in fact contain many acres of wetlands, Rapanos threatened to destroy Dr. Goff if he did not destroy the wetland report, and refused to pay Dr. Goff unless and until he complied. Ibid. In the meantime, without applying for a permit, Rapanos hired construction companies to do $350,000 worth of work clearing the land, filling in low spots, and draining subsurface water. After
Rapanos prevented MDNR inspectors from visiting the site, ignored an MDNR cease-and-desist letter, and refused to obey an administrative compliance order issued by the EPA, the matter was referred to the Department of Justice. In the civil case now before us, the District Court found that Rapanos unlawfully filled 22 acres of wetlands."
THE CLEAN WATER ACT (AS REVISED THROUGH 2002)
http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/pdf/ecwa.pdf
(33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)
AN ACT To provide for water pollution control activities in the Public Health Service
of the Federal Security Agency and in the Federal Works Agency, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I—RESEARCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS
DECLARATION OF GOALS AND POLICY"
"...(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this Act to be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution."
From EPA"Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and sewage treatment plants, comes from many diffuse sources. NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even our underground sources of drinking water. "
"(b) It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this Act."
Clearly, the Justices Scalia and Roberts are ignoring the intent of Congress. The Clean Water Act was promulgated to clean the "waters of the United States". Controlling "nonpoint sources" of pollution may indeed cover every piece of property within the United States - to their chagrin. Furthermore, as with every environmental statute, the Congress yields responsibility to the States under conditions that they "consult with the Administrator" (aka EPA) - the caveat being if the States fail to enforce the statute, the Administrator will assume the role.
Nexus-smexus.